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Abstract—The 5G cellular network is projected to be intro-
duced in 2020 and takes advantage of the small cell technology
to deliver ubiquitous 5G services in an energy efficient manner.
The next logical step is the introduction of network coding-
enabled mobile small cells (NC-MSCs). These are networks
of mobile devices which can be set up on-the-fly, based on
demand, and cover the urban landscape. Furthermore, they
allow network offloading through multi-hop device-to-device
(D2D) communication to provide high data rate services. In this
paper we introduce DISTANT, a decentralized key management
scheme specifically designed to provide security in a network
which takes advantage of the benefits of NC-MSCs. In our key
management scheme, we distribute the certification authority
(CA) functions using threshold secret sharing. Each network
node is provided with a share of the master private key such
that key management services are available “anywhere, anytime”.
Finally, our distributed CA takes advantage of the self-generated
certificate paradigm. Certificates can therefore be issued and
renewed without the interaction of the distributed CA which
minimizes the communication overhead.
Index Terms—5G, Beyond 5G, Decentralized Systems, D2D
Communications, Key Management, Mobile Small Cells, Network
Coding, Security, Small Cells, Wireless Ad Hoc Networks
I. INTRODUCTION
It has been almost a decade since the 4G cellular network
was introduced. Since that time, the number of connected
wireless devices (e.g., PDA’s, smartphones, tablets, machines
falling within the Internet-of-Things concept) has seen im-
mense growth. By 2021, the number of connected wireless
devices will have grown by a factor between 100 and 10,000
with mobile demands having grown by a factor of 1,000 per
device [1]. This surge puts a lot of pressure on the 4G network
which has to share its resources among the growing number of
devices and its increasing demand in mobile data. This causes
a reduction in data rates and an increase in latency.
To address these challenges, new technologies are emerging
to create the next generation 5G network. One of these is
This research work leading to this publication has received funding from the
European Union’s Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation programme under
grant agreement H2020-MSCA-ITN-2016-SECRET-722424.
small cell technology. The small cell technology is the most
effective solution to deliver ubiquitous 5G services in an
energy efficient manner to its users. The next logical step
would be the introduction of network coding-enabled mobile
small cells (NC-MSCs). These are networks of mobile devices
(i.e. user equipment) which can be set up on-the-fly, based
on demand, and cover the urban landscape. The relative
close proximity of these mobile devices allow for multi-
hop device-to-device (D2D) communications. This removes
the necessity for network operators to install and maintain
additional network infrastructure, enables network offloading
and provides high data rate services such as video sharing,
gaming and proximity-aware social networking with improved
throughput, energy efficiency and latency [2].
The current network infrastructure secures data transmis-
sions of network subscribers through the offline distribution of
cryptographic keys, present in SIM cards. These keys establish
a secure channel between the mobile device and the network
infrastructures, authenticates network subscribers and provide
them access to network resources. The network infrastructure
essentially acts as a router to deliver data to communicating
network subscribers. To offload the network using NC-MSCs,
multi-hop D2D communications has to be secured. This
requires cryptographic keys which are shared between any
arbitrary set of mobile devices. Furthermore, these keys require
updating mechanisms to guarantee security over an extended
period of time and revocation mechanisms in the event that
a mobile device has been maliciously compromised and no
longer correctly authenticates the owner of that mobile device.
Therefore, providing secure multi-hop D2D communications
in NC-MSCs require its own key management scheme.
Traditionally, a key management scheme relies on an online
centralized trusted third party (TTP). This TTP is considered
trustworthy and secure by every user inside the network. It
can therefore distribute cryptographic keys between any set of
network devices which would consequently be used to set up a
secure communications channel. However, the authors believe
that neither any individual mobile device nor the network
infrastructure can act as the online centralized TTP to securely
distribute cryptographic keying material in an online fashion.
Neither of these entities is considered to be secure against
physical compromise or denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. These
attacks could cause the distribution of falsified cryptographic
keys and the unavailability of the key management service
respectively.
In this paper, we introduce our design of the novel key
management scheme called DISTANT (DIStributed Trusted
Authority-based key managemeNT). This is the first key
management scheme that is specifically designed to provide
security in a network architecture wishing to take advantage
of the benefits of NC-MSCs. The main features are the use
of threshold secret sharing [3] and self-generated certificates
[4]–[6]. The trust distributing capabilities of threshold secret
sharing allows a distributed TTP to provide key management
services. Furthermore, verifiable secret sharing and proactive
secret sharing provides robustness against malicious users.
The paradigm of self-generated certificates provides keying
material such that proxy signatures can be created. These
are signatures created by network users on behalf of the
TTP. This removes the necessity to periodically contact the
distributed TTP to renew certificates and thus minimizes the
communication overhead. Moreover, the proposed protocols
are based on the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) which
uses modular arithmetic and are therefore computationally
more efficient than schemes using pairing-based operations.
Lastly, the survey [7] proposed seven requirements (security,
connectivity, overhead, scalability, sustainability, fairness and
secure routing independence) that a key management scheme
must satisfy in order to efficiently secure beyond 5G mobile
small cells. This key management scheme satisfies all of these
seven requirements.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews the related works. Section III discusses the network
model. Section IV describes the proposed key management
protocols. Section V discusses our future work and section VI
concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
The idea of a distributed TTP was born in 1999 with
the emergence of mobile ad hoc networks (MANETs) and
the necessity to provide security in these types of networks.
MANETs are unable to rely on any network infrastructure such
that the mobile devices making up the network are required
to self-organize the key management and provide security
services. Zhou et al. [8] proposed the first decentralized key
management scheme by distributing trust from an online
centralized CA to a proper set of network users, called servers.
By utilizing threshold secret sharing [3], the master private key
(usually in possession by the centralized CA) is divided into
n shares. These shares are then distributed to n users, such
that a threshold t users can collectively provide certification
services. The signed certificates can be distributed throughout
the network and their signatures can be verified using the mas-
ter public key. Furthermore, verifiable [9], [10] and proactive
secret sharing [11], [12] were proposed to provide robustness
against malicious attackers [13]. However, the asymmetric
distribution of trust and the associated workload to provide
certification services may lead to an unavailability of the
service in large parts of the network, cause selfish behavior
and complicates the creation of cooperating mechanisms. Luo
et al. [14] solved these issues by distributing the shares of
the master private key among all the network users. Even
joining network nodes are provided with their own master
private key share such that certification services are always
locally available. Unfortunately, this decentralized scheme still
requires the periodic interaction with a threshold number of
network users due to expiring certificates. This translates to a
large communication overhead during network deployment.
Advancements in the field of cryptology gave rise to self-
generated certificates [4]–[6]. This paradigm combines certifi-
cateless public key cryptography [15] with self-certifying keys
[16], [17]. Baek et al. [4] and Liu et al. [5] based their scheme
on the earlier works of self-certifying keys [16], [17] which
are unable to provide explicit authentication. Lai et al. [6]
based their scheme on the improved concept of self-certificates
[18] which is able to provide explicit authentication and thus
reaches an increased level of trust. The construction of self-
generated certificates allows users to create proxy signatures.
These are signatures created by a network user on behalf of
the TTP. This removes the necessity to periodically contact
the distributed TTP to renew certificates. The concept of self-
generated certificates was eventually proposed for a MANET
environment in [19], however this scheme suffers from three
major drawbacks. First, verifiable secret sharing is not included
which allows malicious users to transmit false keying material
without being detected. Second, proactive secret sharing is not
included which allows a mobile adversary [13] from collecting
a threshold amount of shares and break the security of the
entire network. Finally, the master key pair is created in a
distributed fashion. This requires the complete trust of the
initial users since a participating malicious user could already
compromise security during the network initialization.
III. PROPOSED MODEL
A. Network Model
The densification of the urban landscape by means of NC-
MSCs and network offloading by means of enabling multi-hop
D2D communications leads to a network which is capable of
increasing data rates and energy efficiency while reducing the
latency and interference. This network model is introduced
by the EU-funded H2020-MSCA project ”SECRET” [20] and
provides opportunities for both network operators and network
users. The network model is illustrated in Fig. 1.
Many of the prescribed advantages can be credited to the
introduction of ordinary small cells. Since the strength of
a radio signal diminishes with the square of the distance,
replacing large transmissions to and from the base station (BS)
by multiple shorter transmissions provides significant energy
savings. Similarly, the shorter and less powerful signals can
reduce interference which allows for a higher throughput and
Fig. 1. The network model as introduced by project ”SECRET” [21].
increased data rates. Lower latency is realized by providing
a more direct route between a source node (SN) and a des-
tination node (DN). Nevertheless, mobile small cells provide
additional advantages. They can be set up on-the-fly, based
on demand, at any place, at any time, using existing mobile
devices. This wireless ad hoc network can therefore function
at a low cost since network operators are not required to install
and maintain additional network infrastructure. Furthermore,
mobile small cells support time and space varying traffic [22].
Finally, network coding can be utilized which optimizes the
throughput of data.
In the network model, the cellular network is partitioned
into a network (or cloud) of NC-MSCs. Each of these is
controlled and maintained by a hotspot (i.e. cluster-head). This
is a mobile node within the cluster that is selected to become
the local radio manager. In addition, each hotspot is controlled
by a centralized software-defined controller. Through cooper-
ation these hotspots form a wireless network that has several
gateways/entry points to the mobile network using intelligent
high-speed connections. Data traffic between mobile nodes is
established through multi-hop D2D communications. Suppose
that a mobile node wishes to share data, such as a multimedia
file or data related to an online multiplayer game, with two
other mobile nodes. The mobile node in possession of this data
(i.e. SN) transmits the data to the mobile nodes requesting
the data (i.e. DNs). Notice that these mobile nodes are not
required to be in the same mobile small cell. Using multi-hop
D2D communications and the assistance of relay nodes (RNs),
data can be transmitted from the SN to the DNs.
B. Discrete Logarithm Problem
The security of this key management scheme is based on the
difficulty of solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP).




p, q Two large prime numbers.
Z∗p,Z∗q The multiplicative group of integers modulo p and q
respectively.
g A generator of Z∗p with order q.
h(·) A collision-free hash function.
fM (x) The master polynomial of degree t− 1.
fu(x) The update polynomial of degree t− 1.
t The threshold value of a secret sharing scheme.
ai A random coefficient of the master polynomial fM (x).
(SKM , PKM ) The master private key and the master public key.
si The secret share of node i.
IDi The network identifier of node i.
wi The witness value i of t.
svi The secret value randomly picked by entity i.
ci→j The partial commitment value created by entity i for
node j.
ci,k The commitment value of node i’s kth certificate.
SKi→j The partial private key created by entity i for node j.
(SKi,k, PKi,k) The private and public key of node i’s kth certificate.
CERT i,k The kth self-generated certificate of node i.
(r,R) The random signature creation values.
σ = (α, β) The signature for a self-generated certificate.
(R̄, ᾱ) The signature verification values.
Ki,j The pairwise key between node i and j.
Φ The set of t neighbors of a node.
λΦi (x) The Lagrange coefficient for node i in the set Φ.
δi,j The random shuffling value agreed by node i and j.
δi The sum of random shuffling values of node i.
solve this problem, provided that p − 1 is not a product of
small primes and p is sufficiently large.
Let Z∗p be the cyclic multiplicative group of non-zero in-
tegers modulo prime p and let g be a generator. Given an
element a ∈ Z∗p, find the element b such that a ≡ gb (mod p).
IV. PROPOSED DISTANT PROTOCOLS
This section describes the protocols of the proposed key
management scheme. This scheme is divided up into six main
protocols: network initialization, creation and update of self-
generated certificates, verification of a self-generated certifi-
cate, establishment of secure communication, node joining and
share updating. Table I specifies the notation used throughout
the proposed protocols.
A. Network Initialization
It is assumed that a TTP, such as a network operator or a
collaborative effort from multiple network operators initialize
the network. During network initialization, an initial set of
t nodes (i.e. mobile devices) are selected and provided with
keying material. This keying material allows t nodes to col-
lectively initialize joining nodes during network deployment.
Therefore, this scheme does not rely on an online centralized
TTP for key management services. The master key pair and
its shares are created as follows:
1) The TTP generates two large prime numbers p and q
such that q|p − 1, selects a generator g of the cyclic
multiplicative group Z∗p with order q and a collision-
free hash function h(·).
2) The TTP generates a random master polynomial fM (x)
of degree t− 1 in which each ai ∈ Z∗q :
fM (x) = a0 + a1x+ · · ·+ at−1xt−1. (1)
3) The master key pair (SKM , PKM ) is defined as:
SKM = fM (0), (2)
PKM ≡ gSKM (mod p). (3)
4) The TTP provides each node i with their identifier IDi
and their share si of the master private key:
si ≡ fM (IDi) (mod q). (4)
5) To allow the verifiability of shares, the TTP computes
witness values wi ≡ gai (mod p) for i = {0, . . . , t−1}
and provides each node with public values (p, q, g, h(·),








The TTP initializes an interactive protocol with each node i
to establish its keying material. This protocol works as follows:
1) The TTP picks a random secret value svTTP ∈ Z∗q and
computes the partial commitment cTTP→i:
cTTP→i ≡ gsvTTP (mod p). (6)
2) The TTP transmits (cTTP→i) to node i.
3) The node i picks a random secret value svi ∈ Z∗q and
computes its commitment ci:
ci ≡ gsvi · cTTP→i (mod p). (7)
4) The node i transmits (IDi, ci) to the TTP.
5) The TTP computes the partial private key SKTTP→i:
SKTTP→i ≡ svTTP +SKM ·h(IDi, ci) (mod q). (8)
6) The TTP transmits (SKTTP→i) to node i.
7) The node i computes its key pair (SKi, PKi):
SKi ≡ svi + SKTTP→i (mod q), (9)
PKi ≡ gSKi (mod p). (10)
8) The 2-tuple (ci, SKi) is the TTP’s signature on certifica-
tion information (IDi, ci) and can be verified as follows:
PKi ≡ gSKi (mod p) ≡ ci · PKh(IDi,ci)M (mod p).
(11)
Once the t initial nodes have obtained their keying material,
the TTP destroys the master polynomial fM (x) and the associ-
ated master private key SKM . The initialized nodes can create
and update their self-generated certificate and collectively
provide key management services to joining nodes.
B. Creation and Update of Self-Generated Certificates
In our key management scheme, nodes can independently
create and update their self-generated certificate. If these
certificates are renewed frequently (e.g. on a daily basis) then
key revocation becomes redundant [19]. Let the initial keying
material of a node i be (ci,0, SKi,0, PKi,0) and kept secret
during network deployment. The initial keying material is used
to derive keying material (ci,k, SKi,k, PKi,k) for the kth self-
generated certificate as follows:
1) The node i picks a random secret value svi ∈ Z∗q and
computes its new commitment ci,k:
ci,k ≡ gsvi (mod p). (12)
2) The node i computes its new key pair (SKi,k, PKi,k):
SKi,k ≡ svi + SKi,0 · h(IDi, ci,k) (mod q), (13)
PKi,k ≡ gSKi,k (mod p). (14)
With this keying material, node i creates its kth self-
generated certificate CERTi,k. This certificate contains the
node’s identity IDi, the initial commitment ci,0, the new
commitment ci,k, the new public key PKi,k, a timestamp1
TS (e.g. the day or period that the certificate is valid) and a
signature σ. The signature is created from the new private key
SKi,k using Schnorr’s signature scheme [23]:
1) The node i picks a random secret value r ∈ Z∗q and
computes R ≡ gr (mod p).
2) The node i computes the signature σ = (α, β) in which:
α = h(IDi, ci,0, ci,k, PKi,k, TS,R), (15)
β ≡ r + SKi,k · α (mod q). (16)
C. Verification of a Self-Generated Certificate
The kth self-generated certificate of node i is denoted as
CERTi,k = (IDi, ci,0, ci,k, PKi,k, TS, σ). This certificate
can be distributed and its authenticity verified as follows:
1) The verifier checks the validity of the certificate based
on the timestamp TS.
2) The verifier computes the values of R̄ and ᾱ:
R̄ ≡ gβ · (PKi,k)−α (mod p), (17)
ᾱ = h(IDi, ci,0, ci,k, PKi,k, TS, R̄). (18)
3) The verifier accepts the signature on the self-generated
certificate if α = ᾱ is correct.
4) The verifier accepts the content of the self-generated
certificate if the following equivalancy is correct:





1The timestamp prevents a malicious node from disrupting communication
by replacing a node’s current certificate for a stored certificate which the node
no longer uses.
D. Establishment of Secure Communication
This key management scheme allows for the establishment
of a shared pairwise key Ki,j of arbitrary bit-length between
node i and j from the exchange of self-generated certificates.
This symmetric key can be used to encrypt and authenticate
data and is computed as follows:
Ki,j ≡ h(PKSKij (mod p)) ≡ h(g
SKj ·SKi (mod p))
≡ h(gSKi·SKj (mod p)) ≡ h(PKSKji (mod p)) ≡ Kj,i.
(20)
E. Node Joining
Admission of a new node happens in a distributed fashion.
Each network node in possession of its keying material and
a share of the master private key is capable of providing
key management services. The protocol underneath provides
a joining node A with its initial keying material:
1) The node A broadcasts its identifier IDA, provided by
the network operator, to t neighboring nodes. Let Φ
denote the set of t neighboring nodes.
2) Each node i ∈ Φ interacts with the cellular network to
verify the authenticity of node A and its identifier IDA.
Furthermore, the cellular network informs whether A
can be provided with a share of the master private key2.
If the binding between node A and its identifier IDA is
correct, the protocol continues.
3) Each node i ∈ Φ picks a random secret value svi ∈ Z∗q
and computes the partial commitment ci→A:
ci→A ≡ gsvi (mod p). (21)
4) Each node i ∈ Φ transmits (ci→A, CERT i) and public
network parameters (p, q, g, h(·), PKM ) to node A.
5) The node A verifies the authenticity of each self-
generated certificate CERT i∈Φ and obtains the iden-
tifiers IDi∈Φ of its neighbors.
6) The node A picks a random secret value svA ∈ Z∗q and
computes its commitment cA:




λΦi (0) (mod p). (22)







7) The node A chooses a temporary key KA,i∈Φ and uses
the public keys on the received certificates to securely
transmit (cA,KA,i∈Φ) to its neighbors Φ.
8) Each node i ∈ Φ computes the partial private key
SKi→A:
SKi→A ≡ svi + si · h(IDA, cA) (mod q). (24)
2A share of the master private key is provided if the cellular network is
convinced that node A will be unable to perform a Sybil attack [24] (e.g.
providing node A with a share keeps the total number of shares within A’s
household below t).
9) Each node i ∈ Φ securely transmits (SKi→A) to node
A.
10) The node A computes its key pair (SKA, PKA):
SKA ≡ svA +
∑
i∈Φ
(SKi→A · λΦi (0)) (mod q), (25)
PKA ≡ gSKA (mod p). (26)
11) The node A verifies its keying material as follows:
PKA ≡ gSKA (mod p) ≡ cA · PKh(IDA,cA)M (mod p).
(27)
If the cellular network allowed node A to obtain a share of
the master private key, then the protocol continues:
1) The node A creates its first self-generated certificate
CERTA and transmits (CERTA, CERT i∈Φ) to its
neighbors Φ.
2) Each node i ∈ Φ is hereby informed of the neighbors
which are providing the key management service for
node A. Then, each node i ∈ Φ randomly selects the
certificate CERT j of a node j ∈ Φ.
3) Each node i ∈ Φ verifies the authenticity of CERT j
and computes the shared pairwise key Ki,j .
4) Each node i ∈ Φ contacts neighbor j and agrees upon a
random shuffling value3 δi,j ∈ Z∗q . To cancel out these
shuffling values when node A computes its share, and
depending on the node identifiers, either node i or j will
use the negative value of δi,j :
δi,j =
{
−δi,j IDi < IDj ,
δi,j IDi > IDj .
(28)
5) Each node i ∈ Φ obtains at least one shuffling value. We
define δi to be the sum of the agreed shuffling values




6) Each node i ∈ Φ computes the shuffled partial share
si→A in which λΦi (IDA) is the Lagrange coefficient as
defined in equation (23):
si→A ≡ si · λΦi (IDA) + δi (mod q). (30)
7) Each node i ∈ Φ verifies the authenticity of CERTA,
computes the shared pairwise key Ki,A and securely
transmits (si→A) to node A.




si→A (mod q). (31)
9) The node A verifies the correctness of its share sA using
equation (5).
3The shuffling value protects the secrecy of every node’s share.
F. Share Updating
To prevent a mobile adversary [13] from reconstructing the
master private key, we periodically update each node’s share
to invalidate the shares which have been compromised. As
proposed by proactive secret sharing algorithms [11], [12],
update polynomials fu(x) with fu(0) = 0 are periodically
created. In the first update period, each node i can compute
its new share as follows:
si,new ≡ si + fu(IDi) (mod q) (32)
The new share is effectively obtained from the new polynomial
fnew(x) = fM (x) + fu(x) while the master private key is
unchanged, since fnew(0) = fM (0) + fu(0) = SKM . Due to
the page limitations, details of this protocol will be provided
in a future work.
V. FUTURE WORK
Future developments of this work include three major
sections. First, we plan to expand upon the share updating
protocol. Second, the security of the key management scheme
will be evaluated based on an adversarial model which is
realistic and suitable for NC-MSCs and security proofs will be
provided. Finally, the effiency of the key management scheme
will be evaluated both analytically and through simulations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented the initial design of the
first key management scheme which is specifically designed to
establish secure multi-hop D2D communication between users
in NC-MSCs. Each of the seven proposed requirements in [7]
are achieved: (1) A high level of security is achieved through
the bootstrapping of a TTP in the network initialization phase
and robustness against active adversaries is achieved using
verifiable and proactive secret sharing. (2) A high level of
connectivity is achieved with the exchange and easy veri-
fication of self-generated certificates, allowing any arbitrary
set of nodes to establish a secure communications channel.
(3) The overhead is low from both a computational and a
communication perspective. The construction of self-generated
certificates rely on modular arithmetic while certificates can
be renewed independently. (4) The local availability of key
management services and the construction of protocols allow
for a scalable network. (5) Sustainability is achieved from a
security perspective through share updating, while overhead
and connectivity are unaffected by an extended network life-
time. (6) The fully distributed key management service is fairly
distributed and will minimize nodes from acting selfishly.
Finally, (7) this key management scheme does not rely on
secure routing. Therefore, we can conclude that this key
management scheme is suitable and capable of establishing
secure communications in NC-MSCs.
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